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Summary An exciting new study on ravens by Bugnyar,
Reber, and Buckner (2016) raises important questions about
whether nonhuman animals are capable of simulating other
minds, rather than theorizing about them.
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The question of whether animals have the capacity to think about
other minds remains a contentious topic in comparative cogni-
tion. Despite over 40 years of research, there is little consensus on
whether any animal other than humans has a theory of mind.
This research originated from a question posed by Premack
and Woodruff in 1978: “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of
mind?”. Despitemany elegant studies using complex experimen-
tal designs, the field has generated more confusion than clarity,
probably because a number of high-profile researchers have
discontinued their research programs or changed their minds
about their findings, or because theoretical psychologists and
philosophers with little empirical training or experience testing
animals in social cognitive paradigms have suggested experi-
mental designs that they believe will fix many of the apparent
problems with animal mindreading research, but that are empir-
ically naïve. Neither is the case with Bugnyar, Reber, and
Buckner (2016), two ethologists and a philosopher who have
pooled their experience to design an elegant experiment that gets
as close as any other to providing evidence that (some) animals
may recognize (some) mental states in others.
We believe that part of the problem concerning this area of
comparative cognition, more than any other, is the constraining
focus on whether animals possess any aspect of human theory of
mind.Although humans seamlesslymake predictions aboutwhat
others may be thinking, it remains unclear whether we make
these predictions by scaffolding upon perceptual cues, such as
another’s line of sight (theory approach), or by using our own
introspection and inferences based on previous experience (sim-
ulation approach). Most research on animal mindreading has
focused on the theory approach, but this has left a field littered
with arguments about whether mindreading actually occurs at all
in animals, and what positive evidence would look like anyway.
The main argument is that animals would act similarly in re-
sponse to mindreading or to behavior-reading alone, without
recourse to understanding what mental states, if any, may drive
another’s behavior. For example, does following another’s gaze
mean that a viewer understands that the gazer is seeing some-
thing, or does the viewer simply compute that the gazer is ori-
ented toward a specific object and, statistically speaking, is more
likely to interact with that goal object than with another. The
simulation approach does not suffer from these limitations based
on behavior-reading, because it is not dependent on perceiving
the links between individuals, cues, and objects. For example, I
may open a box in which a toy snake springs up and scares me.
If I see someone I care for approach the same box, this triggers a
memory of that aversive experience, and I may try to stop my
loved one from experiencing the same aversive event. I remem-
ber the state I was in while experiencing the aversive event, and
would want to stop it from happening to someone I care about.
But, isn’t this just my memory of something aversive, even
though it didn’t happen to me? The key here is whether I would
stop someone I did not like from opening the same box. My
memory of the event would be just as aversive, but in this con-
text, I might want to harm another or not care about the conse-
quences of their actions. Introspection, in this case, would stop
me from preventing another opening the box, because I would
want them to experience the same aversive event that I had
experienced. This has been termed experience projection, and
we were perhaps the first to find evidence of this in a nonhuman
animal, namely theWestern scrub-jay (Emery&Clayton, 2001).
Briefly, jays were allowed to hide food (cache) in two differ-
ent trays in two different social contexts—either in private or in
the presence of another jay. Then, 3 h later, the cachers were
allowed to retrieve their caches, always in private.Whenpresented
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with the tray they had previously cached in in the presence of a
potential observer, they consistently recached—that is, moved
those caches to new places (a new tray). If presented with the tray
they had cached in in private, they did not recache.We interpreted
this as the birds maximizing their future returns bymoving caches
to places that the observing birds did not know about. However,
most intriguing, and most relevant to the issue of experience pro-
jection, was the fact that we presented these two conditions to jays
with experience of being thieves (having stolen caches they did
notmake in a previous experiment), and separately to jayswith no
pilfering experience. Only birds with pilfering experience per-
formed the protective recaching behavior.We suggested that those
birds alone inferred that an observer might pilfer their caches, and
so implemented protective actions to prevent this possibility. As
such, they may have simulated the future behavior of a potential
thief on the basis of their own specific previous experience.
Unfortunately, there isn’t the space to go into arguments for why
this should or should not be considered experience projection (e.g.,
Emery&Clayton, 2008), ormost intriguingof all,whybirdswhohad
not seen a bird caching, but had stolen caches they themselves had not
made, should then implement a suite of cache protection strategies
when in the opposite situation (i.e., potential victims) themselves.
Bugnyar and colleagues took a different approach to the question
of whether corvids simulate other minds. They adapted a paradigm
first suggested by Heyes (1998) to be used with primates. Heyes
suggested that chimps could wear different goggles with different
colors to distinguish them—one pair transparent, the other opaque.
If those experienced chimpswere then confrontedwith other chimps
wearing either the opaque or the transparent glasses (which could
only be discriminated by their color), then the original chimpswould
behave differently toward the newcomers on the basis of their own
experience of the goggles. Rather than make ravens wear goggles
(and all the potential problems that could cause), Bugnyar and col-
leagues used peepholes to differentiate between the seeing condi-
tions, so that birds could see into a caching arena through one
peephole, but not through another. First, birds cached either when
a large window was open, so that another raven could see them
caching from an adjacent room, or when the window was closed,
and a raven remained in the adjacent room but could not see them
caching. Cachers hid the food faster and displayed fewer revisits to
cache sites to improve the caches if they had been observed caching,
as compared to when no observer had been present. Subjects were
then given experience of the peepholes, by entering the side com-
partment and watching an experimenter cache in the arena through
one peephole (but not through a second, blocked peephole). Finally,
the subjectsweremoved back into the larger arena and cachedwhen
bothwindowswere closed, but one of the peepholes in thewindows
was open. The clever bit was that Bugnyar and colleagues played
the sounds of a raven moving in the adjacent room, from which it
was unable to observe caching. Therefore, the cachers likely per-
ceived another raven in the adjacent room who they could not see,
but who had the capacity to see their caching through the peephole.
In this peephole condition, the cachers behaved as if another raven
was present and could see them. Bugnyar and colleagues suggested
that the cachers had applied their experience of the peepholes to the
potential for another bird to observe them, and so decided they
should implement appropriate cache protection strategies.
Althoughwe agree that this interpretation seems valid, there are a
number of small problems. The first is that the choice of protective
behaviors was completely post-hoc, and the more obvious protec-
tive behaviors did not differ between test conditions. Speed of cach-
ing or checking previous cache sites are not typical cache protection
strategies. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the ravens’ deci-
sions on where to cache did not appear to be driven by perception;
that is, they did not tend to cache in locations that a potential pilferer
could not see through the peephole. The peepholes themselveswere
quite low to the ground,with a 2-cmdiameter, and it is not clear that
the cacher could not see that no bird was present in the adjacent
room.Although theybehaved the sameas in theobserved condition,
this might have been a generally protective response to a strange
situation (e.g., the sounds of an unseen bird). A couple of additional
peephole conditions could have been more informative, such as
ones in which the peepholes were positioned higher up, and so
completely out of the cacher’s sight, or both peepholes were kept
open but only one had a perch next to it (so that only a bird that had
experience of that perchwould recognize that the perchwas the only
viewpoint from which a bird could spy on the caching). As song-
birds, ravens should be capable of accurately pinpointing the loca-
tion of a sound (such as another moving raven), so noise played
from the back of the compartment could have been differentiated
from noise at the location of the peephole. Perhaps in additional
conditions, sounds could be played either at the back or near the
peephole (the only relevant location for observing caches).
Despite these minor issues, we reiterate our earlier statement
that we believe this study is a significant step forward in our
understanding of whether nonhuman animals think about other
minds, and that it should spark a new focus on whether animals
are capable of simulating other minds.
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